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Abstract
This Note examines whether amendment of the ITS charter is necessary to effectuate re-
searcher access, or whether, as a matter of international law, in its capacity as an international
organization (“IO”), the ITS can allow access without amendments. Addressing this question im-
plicitly raises two collateral issues that inform the discussion. First, to what degree should an IO
Member State’s domestic legal framework dictate that State’s position in a consensus-based IO
decision-making process. Second, when changes in the global political context render an existing
IO legal structure ill-suited to an IO’s evolving mission, to what degree is it appropriate to re-
interpret rather than amend an IO’s charter documents in order to accommodate the requirements
of the new situation? Part I of this Note first outlines the history of the ITS and the treaty creating
it, then briefly describes the approach to personal data protection taken in the European Union and
the United States. Part I also addresses jurisdictional issues: the legal status of an IO in relation
to domestic legal regimes, and the EU approach to jurisdiction are both considered in the context
of the Archive controversy. Part II of this Note contrasts the two basic positions taken during the
negotiation process–for and against amendment–and considers how each approach might find sup-
port in treaty language, past practice, existent legal frameworks, and in equitable considerations.
Part III posits a hypothetical means to proceed without amendment, but argues that alternative
mechanisms are likely no less burdensome, and that the amendment process is itself beneficial.
Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting a practical means to work around the current impasse,
without compromising the integrity of the legal framework of the ITS.
NOTE
RECONCILING HOLOCAUST SCHOLARSHIP
AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION:





On July 26, 2006, eight of eleven International Tracing Ser-
vice ("ITS") Member States signed an agreement ("Agreement")
that will, for the first time ever, make the ITS-administered
archive ("Archive") of Holocaust documents available to outside
researchers.1 By October 30, 2006 the remaining three ITS
Members had also signed the Agreement. 2 Many expected ac-
cess to commence as soon as the end of 2006, and the long effort
to open the Archive seemed to be nearing a successful conclu-
sion.3 The acrimonious environment that had surrounded the
negotiations-one stakeholder had likened Germany's negotiat-
ing position to Holocaust denial-became one of conciliation
and qualified optimism regarding the prospect of swift ratifica-
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law; Notes & Articles Edi-
tor, Volume XXX, Fordham International Law Journal.
1. See Germany Signs Nazi Files Accord BBC ONLINE, July 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/5216470.stm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Germany Signs]
(stating agreement has been reached, signed by some Member States); see also Nations
Agree to Open Archives of Holocaust, DESERET NEWS, July 27, 2006, at A4 [hereinafter Na-
tions Agree] (stating agreement has been reached, signed by some Member States); Nazi
Files Thrown Open to Research, BIRmINGIHAM POST (UK),July 27, 2006, at 10 [hereinafter
Nazi Files] (stating agreement has been reached, signed by some Member States).
2. See International Tracing Service ("ITS"), Amendment of the Bonn Accords,
http://www.its-arolsen.org/english/index.html (follow "News" then "Amendment of
the Bonn Agreements" hyperlinks) (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (announcing all parties
signed as of October 30, 2006); see also Arthur Max, Meeting Called to Review Progress on
Opening Long-Secret Nazi Archive, AP WORLDSTREAM, Jan. 24, 2007 (mentioning all Mem-
ber States signed agreement to open ITS archive ("Archive")).
3. See Nations Agree, supra note 1 (mentioning expectation of ITS archive
("Archive") opening by end of 2006); see also Accord to Open Nazi Archives Signed, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A6 (noting statements anticipating Archive will open by Decem-
ber 31, 2006).
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tion of the Agreement by Members.4
Since the creation of the ITS, both Germany and the EU
have enacted strong data privacy laws.5 Since 1991, when efforts
to open the Archive first began, Germany, along with Italy, the
ITS Director, and occasionally other Member States, repeatedly
argued that in order to open the Archive, the ITS charter docu-
ments had to be amended to create substantial data privacy safe-
guards and effective means of redress.6 Germany and the other
parties emphasized the paramount importance of protecting in-
dividuals whose personal information is contained within the
Archive.' In contrast, the United States, along with other Mem-
ber States and interested parties favored opening the Archive im-
mediately, without amending the charter documents.8 They ar-
gued that data safeguard mechanisms and means of redress be-
yond those already existing under respective Member States'
domestic legal systems were unnecessary, and would create need-
less complications and further delay.9 To a certain extent Ger-
4. See Roger Cohen, U.S.-German Flare-Up Over Vast Nazi Camp Archives, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2006, at A3 (reporting comments by Paul Shapiro, Director of Advanced Holo-
caust Studies at United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum, characterizing hiding
Archive records as form of Holocaust denial; reporting other officials and stakeholders
on both sides of issue); see also Nazi Files, supra note I (reporting optimistic comments
of German Deputy Foreign Minister Guenter Gloser); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State
Diplomatic Mission to Germany, Ambassador Timken Participates in ITS Amendment
Signing Ceremony (July 26, 2006), available at http://berlin.usembassy.gov/germany/
timkenits.html) (releasing statement by U.S. Ambassador to Germany William Timken
congratulating Member States, urging swift parliamentary ratification by States requir-
ing that step).
5. See Gesetz zum Schutz vor MiBbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der
Datenverarbeitung [Bundesdatenschutzgesetz] [German Federal Data Protection Act],
Jan. 27, 1977, BGBI. I at 201 (F.R.G.) (establishing first German Federal data privacy
statute, subsequently replaced by German Federal Data Protection Act of 1990); see also
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T. S. No. 108, 20 I.L.M. 317
[hereinafter Council Convention] (establishing requirement for and parameters of
data privacy laws for EU Member States).
6. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting insistence by Germany and former ITS Di-
rector Charles Biedermann that treaty be amended, data privacy safeguards created);
see also Sam Loewenberg & Julian Borger, Closed Archive Leads to Holocaust Denial Claim,
GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 21, 2006, at 17 (describing arguments in favor of amendment and
creation of privacy safeguard framework); Nations Agree, supra note 1 (mentioning It-
aly's past objections to opening the Archive).
7. See Cohen, supra note 4 (describing German position); see also Loewenberg &
Borger, supra note 6 (outlining German position).
8. See Cohen, supra note 4 (outlining U.S. position); see also Loewenberg & Borger,
supra note 6 (describing U.S. position).
9. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting arguments of parties disfavoring amend-
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many's arguments prevailed-the announced Agreement took
the form of amendments to the ITS charter documents.'0 The
text of the Agreement is not publicly available, so it is not possi-
ble to analyze exactly how the competing points of view were
reconciled." Reports in the media indicate that access will be
facilitated by providing digital copies of the Archive to Member
States, a proposal the United States had raised during negotia-
tions. 1 2
Looking past the legal issues, the conflicting positions of the
parties might be understood to reflect a divergence in their
weighing of potential costs and benefits, i.e., whether the possi-
bility that personal details of knowable individuals might be re-
vealed in a way that would harm those individuals or their fami-
lies in fact outweighs the benefit to society that will follow from
allowing access to one of the most extensive and important col-
lections of Holocaust records in existence.'" It is frequently ar-
gued that because many of the records within the Archive are
unique, opening the Archive will help facilitate a greater under-
standing of the Holocaust. 4 It has also been suggested that the
data privacy issue has been used to delay resolution of the
Archive issue by parties motivated to avoid additional restitution,
insurance, or other claims arising on the basis of information
contained in the Archive. 5 Germany has responded to this criti-
ments); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing arguments against
amendments).
10. See Germany Signs, supra note I (indicating process will be by amendment); see
also Nations Agree, supra note I (stating treaty will be amended); Nazi Files, supra note 1
(noting amendments agreed upon).
11. See Germany Signs, supra note 1 (omitting details of agreement); see also Nations
Agree, supra note 1 (foregoing description of amendments).
12. See Max, supra note 2 (mentioning potential copying, transfer of Archive to
interested Member States); see also Arthur Max, Technical Experts Take Another Step To-
ward Opening Long Secret Nazi Archive for Research, AP ALERT-BUSINESS, Feb. 15, 2007
(reporting preparations for continued digital copying of Archive materials, provision of
Archive Materials in digital format).
13. Cf Cohen, supra note 4 (contrasting U.S. and German arguments); Loewen-
berg & Borger, supra note 6 (Contrasting U.S. and German arguments).
14. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Little Slips of Lost Lives, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at 1
(reporting assessment by Deidre Berger, Director of American Jewish Committee in
Berlin, of potential to gain greater insight into Holocaust from study of documents in
Archive); see also Stephen Graham, Germany Agrees to Open Nazi Archives, CHI. SUN TIMES,
July 27, 2006, at 25 (reporting statement of Israeli Ambassador Shimon Stein regarding
potential to improve understanding of Holocaust).
15. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting insinuation that Germany was intentionally
seeking to delay process, potential for new claims arising from material in Archive); see
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cism by emphasizing that its central concern is protecting Holo-
caust victims from additional harm that would result if their sen-
sitive personal information were made publicly available. 6
Many survivor advocates view the privacy argument as a red her-
ring, arguing that the very people most interested in opening
the Archive are Holocaust survivors themselves. 1 7 Some parties
close to the negotiation process suggested that Germany's insis-
tence on proceeding by amending the charter documents to the
exclusion of other means was also an effort at delay, as argu-
ments over procedure distracted negotiations from the central
substantive issues." Unfortunately, despite the optimistic July
2006 proclamations, the Archive situation might still be far from
resolution.19 As of April 2007, only four ITS Members-Israel,
Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States-have
taken all steps necessary to formally adopt the Agreement; and,
while Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have indi-
cated the possibility of completing ratification by the annual ITS
meeting in May 2007, a typical timeframe for ratification by all
eleven Members has been estimated at closer to three years.2z
also Matthew Campbell, Nazi Files to Solve Holocaust Riddles, SUN. TIMES (UK), Mar. 11,
2007, at 31 (quoting Holocaust survivor questioning timing of Assicurazioni Generali
settlement); Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (quoting Johannes Houwink ten Cate,
Professor of History and Genocide Studies at the University of Amsterdam, "[t] hey have
been stalling for eight years").
16. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting privacy concerns expressed by Germany
and ITS Director); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supa note 6 (describing German
concern over release of private data).
17. See Fleishman, supra note 14 (mentioning longstanding desire of Holocaust
survivors and Jewish organizations to access Archive); see also Campbell, supra note 15
(recounting desire expressed by survivor that Archive be made accessible); Greg
Gordon, Sixty Years Later Survivors are Kept Waiting for Holocaust Facts, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., May 9, 2005, at IA (reporting disbelief at lack of access to Archive expressed by
family members of Holocaust survivors and survivors themselves, including Nobel Lau-
reate Elie Wiesel).
18. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting comments accusing Germany of intention-
ally creating delay); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (recounting criticism
over continual delays).
19. See Melissa Eddy, Opening of Vast Holocaust Archive Could Take Years Longer, AP
WORLDSTREAM, Jan. 19, 2007 (describing final ratification as possibly years away); see also
Max, supra note 12 (reporting final resolution may take years).
20. See Sara J. Bloomfield, Letter to the Editor, A Plea to Open The Holocaust Files,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A14 (recounting which Member States have ratified) (au-
thor is Director of United States Holocaust Memorial Museum); see also Desmond But-
ler, Holocaust Survivors Seek Nazi Files, AP ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2007 (reporting status of
ratification); Eddy, supra note 19 (reporting estimated ratification timeframe for ratifi-
cation).
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Ironically, despite the optimistic July 2006 announcement, the
prospect of continued delays has again led to the possibility of
proceeding without amendments. 21
This Note examines whether amendment of the ITS charter
is necessary to effectuate researcher access, or whether, as a mat-
ter of international law, in its capacity as an international organi-
zation ("10"), the ITS can allow access without amendments.
Addressing this question implicitly raises two collateral issues
that inform the discussion. First, to what degree should an 10
Member State's domestic legal framework dictate that State's po-
sition in a consensus-based 10 decision-making process. Second,
when changes in the global political context render an existing
1O legal structure ill-suited to an 10's evolving mission, to what
degree is it appropriate to re-interpret rather than amend an
10's charter documents in order to accommodate the require-
ments of the new situation?
Part I of this Note first outlines the history of the ITS and
the treaty creating it, then briefly describes the approach to per-
sonal data protection taken in the European Union and the
United States. Part I also addresses jurisdictional issues: the le-
gal status of an 10 in relation to domestic legal regimes, and the
EU approach to jurisdiction are both considered in the context
of the Archive controversy. Part II of this Note contrasts the two
basic positions taken during the negotiation process-for and
against amendment-and considers how each approach might
find support in treaty language, past practice, existent legal
frameworks, and in equitable considerations. Part III posits a hy-
pothetical means to proceed without amendment, but argues
that alternative mechanisms are likely no less burdensome, and
that the amendment process is itself beneficial. Finally, this
Note concludes by suggesting a practical means to work around
the current impasse, without compromising the integrity of the
legal framework of the ITS.
21. See Max, supra note 2 (reporting prospect of continued delay, reporting meet-
ing will be held to consider means to accelerate resolution); see also Butler, supra note
20 (paraphrasing statement of U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, J. Christian Ken-
nedy, stating if ratification not complete by end of year other means for opening
Archive to be pursued).
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I. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING SERVICE
("ITS") ARCHIVE, TREATY FRAMEWORK, AND
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Contents and History of the Archive
1. Contents of the Archive
The Archive contains information on approximately 17.5
million individual civilian Holocaust victims." It is comprised of
over fifty million individual document pages, and fills over
25,000 meters (approximately sixteen linear miles) of shelf
space. 2' The Archive contains camp records and other docu-
mentation compiled by the Nazis, along with records relating to
the immediate aftermath of the war.24 The Nazi-compiled docu-
mentation lists reasons for which prisoners were arrested, details
of punishments, records of illnesses, and myriad other details
that might offer further insight into the conduct of the Holo-
caust.25 Some fear that opening the Archive could result in the
identities of individual victims being made public, along with po-
tentially sensitive details regarding their arrest and internment.26
Germany and the former ITS Director had argued that victims of
medical experiments, persons who collaborated while impris-
oned, persons accused of homosexuality, and other similarly sit-
uated individuals would be harmed, or their surviving family
22. See Official Statement, International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"),
International Tracing Service and Historical Research, Mar. 21, 2006, [hereinafter
ICRC Statement on Historical Research] http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/
html/international-tracing-service-280206 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (indicating approx-
imate number of distinct individuals referenced in Archive); see also Arthur Max, Papers
Open Window Into Hitler's Death Camps, N.J. REc., Nov. 19, 2006, at Al (indicating ap-
proximate number of distinct individuals referenced in Archive).
23. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (indicating volume
of documents in Archive); see also Max supra note 22 (indicating volume of documents
in Archive).
24. See Cohen supra note 4 (indicating provenance of material in Archive); see also
Max supra note 22 (describing sources of documents in Archive).
25. See Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing sensitive nature of materi-
als in Archive); see also Butler, supra note 20 (reporting comments of Paul Shapiro,
Director of the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, characterizing uniqueness of Archive records); Max, supra note 22
(providing detailed descriptions of nature of materials in Archive and their informa-
tional content).
26. See Cohen, supra note 4 (recounting fears expressed by Germany, others that
identities and sensitive information might be released); see also Loewenberg & Borger,
supra note 6 (discussing German reticence to release potentially sensitive information).
1366 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1360
members would be prejudiced, should these details ever become
publicly available.2 7 The contents of the Archive illustrate the
astonishing level of detail with which the Nazis recorded the pro-
gress of the genocide. There are, for example, lists docu-
menting the quantity and size of lice found on inmates. 28 The
Archive also contains records related to familiar historical
figures, such as the ledger documenting Anne Frank's deporta-
tion from Holland, and German industrialist Oskar Schindler's
original list of Jewish factory workers, who were saved from the
camps through his employment in his factory.29 It also contains
records relating to countless unknown others; for example, in
one document an anonymous Soviet prisoner of war who had
been at Auschwitz describes witnessing thousands of prisoners
being herded into the gas chambers each day, piles of dead chil-
dren, gutters flowing with blood, and live prisoners being cast
directly into pits of burning bodies.30
2. Creation of the Tracing Service and the ITS
The ITS grew out of the Central Tracing Bureau, which had
been established by the British Red Cross in 1943 for the pur-
pose of tracing and registering displaced and missing persons.
3 1
In 1944, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
assumed the duties of the Central Tracing Bureau.3 2 From the
27. See Cohen, supra note 4 (pointing out concerns expressed over potential for
harm resultant from release of information from Archive); see also Loewenberg & Bor-
ger, supra note 6 (recounting arguments related to potential harms due to release of
sensitive information from Archive).
28. See Cohen, supra note 4 (mentioning existence of detailed records, including
lice treatments); see also Fleishman, supra note 14 (reporting existence of inventory lists
documenting head lice found on individual prisoners).
29. See Eddy, supra note 19 (reporting copy of Schindler's list of protected workers
resides in Archive); see also Arthur Max, Name Stands Out on Nazi List, CHI. TmB., Nov.
25, 2006, at 11 (describing unique ledger recording deportation and imprisonment of
Anne Frank).
30. See Max, supra note 22 (recounting recorded testimony of Soviet ex-prisoner of
war); see also Fleishman, supra note 14 (recounting other examples of information on
anonymous individual victims contained in Archive).
31. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing evolu-
tion of administration of Archive); see also ITS, History [hereinafter ITS Homepage
History Section], http://www.its-arolsen.org/english/index.html (follow "History"
Hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (outlining history of Archive and Tracing Ser-
vice).
32. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing develop-
ment of Archive administration); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31
(outlining evolution of Archive and Tracing Service).
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end of the war until 1947 the Tracing Service was run by the
U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and during that
period the Archive was moved to its present location in Bad Arol-
sen, Germany.33 The International Refugee Organization ad-
ministered the Tracing Service from 1947 to 1951." 4 The Allied
High Commission for Germany took over the Tracing Service
until the end of the Occupation, whereupon the ITS was estab-
lished.35
The ITS came into existence upon the expiration of World
War II Allied Occupation Authority, for the purpose of continu-
ing the dual task of tracing displaced persons and making infor-
mation about such persons available through appropriate chan-
nels. 6 The ITS was established by an exchange of notes signed
at Bonn on June 6, 1955 ("Bonn Accords"), which consist of the
agreement chartering the organization ("Main Agreement") and
an Annex Agreement ("Annex") that addresses issues surround-
ing the administration of the Tracing Service and Archive.3 7
The Bonn Accords came into force on May 5, 1955, and were set
to expire after five years.38 They were renewed for a five-year
term in 1960, 3 and again for an indefinite term in 1965.40 The
33. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (summarizing his-
tory of administration of Archive); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31
(outlining development of Archive and Tracing Service).
34. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing evolu-
tion of administration of Archive); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31
(summarizing development of Archive and Tracing Service).
35. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (outlining develop-
ment of administration of Archive); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note
31 (recounting history of Archive and Tracing Service).
36. See ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (tracing evolution of
administration of Archive); see also Cohen, supra note 3 (mentioning role of Allied
Forces in gathering documentation and creating Archive).
37. See Agreement Constituting an International Commission for the International
Tracing Service, June 6, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 6186, 219 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter Bonn Ac-
cords]; see also ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing adop-
tion of Bonn Accords); ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31 (recounting his-
tory of Archive).
38. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, pmbl., art. 10 (indicating date of entry into
force, expiry of Bonn Accords as five years from date of entry into force); see also ITS
Homepage History Section, supra note 31 (indicating year of adoption and date of expi-
ration).
39. See Protocol Renewing and Amending the Agreement ofJune 6, 1955, Sept. 30-
Oct. 7, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 444, 377 U.N.T.S 402 [hereinafter 1960 Amendments]; see also
ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31 (mentioning renewal of five year term).
40. See Bekanntmachung der Vereinbarung uber die Verlangerung und Anderung
des Abkomens uber die Errichtung eines Internationalen Ausschusses fur den Interna-
1368 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1360
eleven Member States of the ITS form the International Com-
mission ("IC").41 By consensus agreement, the IC provides oper-
ational directives to the International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC"), the body charged with carrying out the day-to-
day operations of the ITS.4 2 The ICRC discharges this responsi-
bility by appointing a Director, subject to approval by the IC.43
The Bonn Accords require that the Director must be a Swiss na-
tional.4 4 The terms of the settlement ending the Occupation
oblige the German Government to ensure the continued opera-
tion of the ITS, which includes funding ongoing operations.4"
3. Structure of the Bonn Accords
This Note interprets the language of the Bonn Accords in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
("Vienna Convention").46 Because the Bonn Accords and all
tionalen Suchdienst [Protocol Renewing and Amending the Agreement of June 6,
1955], Oct. 15, 1973, BGBI. II at 1520, 1522 (F.R.G.), U.S. Dept. of State Airgram A-
1479 (declassified), July 19, 1967 [hereinafter 1965 Amendments]; see also ITS
Homepage History Section, supra note 31 (noting indefinite renewal effective May 5,
1965).
41. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, art. 1 (establishing International Committee
("IC")); see also ICRC Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing IC as
comprised of eleven Member States).
42. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, art. 2, Annex pmbl. (establishing administra-
tive process and respective roles of IC and ICRC); see also ICRC Statement on Historical
Research, supra note 22 (expressing ICRC understanding of their responsibility in ad-
ministering Archive).
43. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. I (stating IC must approve ICRC
appointee); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31 (describing role of
Director).
44. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 1 (establishing parameters of qual-
ification for ITS Director); see also ITS Homepage History Section, supra note 31
(describing nationality and role of Director).
45. See Bonn Accords, supra note 21, pmbl. (describing requirement that continua-
tion of tracing service be assured); see also Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland [Basic Law], art. 25 (1949) (F.R.G.) (requiring treaty obligations super-
sede German domestic law, thereby binding Germany to treaty obligation); Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REv. 109, 113 n.15 (citing German Basic Law as example of constitution imple-
menting international law); Max, supra note 2 (describing German obligation to fund
Archive, German reticence to entirely absorb cost of scanning Archive into electronic
format).
46. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (codif)ing international law of treaty interpreta-
tion); see also Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 891 (2001) (holding Vienna Convention is used by United States as
guide to general principles of treaty interpretation despite non-ratification by United
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subsequent amendments were concluded before the Vienna
Convention entered into force, the Vienna Convention is not di-
rectly applicable to the Bonn Accords.4 7 In keeping with well-
accepted practice, however, Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the Vienna
Convention are utilized to reflect a codification of customary in-
ternational law on treaty interpretation.48 The Vienna Conven-
tion provides that treaties must be interpreted in good faith, in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms in their writ-
ten context, and in light of the object and purpose of the
treaty.49 The Vienna Convention also provides that when a
treaty is concluded in more than one language, all official ver-
sions are equally authoritative. 50  A treaty's text, including the
preamble and annex, is the primary source from which the
meaning of a treaty is derived.51  Subsequent agreements that
interpret the meaning of a treaty, and subsequent practice in
applying the treaty, may also inform the meaning of treaty lan-
guage. 2 Travauxpreparatoires are acceptable to help confirm the
meaning of a treaty provision; however, their use to actually de-
termine the meaning of a provision is disfavored, unless the text
States); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, part III, introductory note
(1997) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (describing United States' adherence to Vi-
enna Convention).
47. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, pmbl. (noting Bonn Accords entered into
force May 5, 1955); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 4 (stating Vienna
Convention not effective retroactively).
48. See Sovereignty Over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002
I.C.J. 625, 645-646 (Dec. 17) (holding Vienna Convention reflects codification of cus-
tomary international law, utilizing articles 31 and 32 as interpretive guides); see also
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 502 (Jun. 27) (holding Vienna Conven-
tion reflects codification of customary international law, utilizing articles 31 and 33 as
interpretative guide).
49. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31(1) (outlining interpretative
norms); see also LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 501-03 (describing interpretative norms as
enshrined in Vienna Convention articles 31 and 33); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
46, § 325 (enunciating interpretative norms employed by United States, reflective of
Vienna Convention).
50. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 33 (indicating official versions of
treaties are equally effective, regardless of language); see also LaGrand Case, 2001 l.C.J.
at 501-03 (describing interpretative norms as enshrined in Vienna Convention articles
31 and 33).
51. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31 (outlining primacy of textual
interpretation); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46, § 325(1) (indicating pri-
macy of treaty language).
52. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31 (permitting use of subsequent
practice to inform meaning); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46, § 325(2)
(describing acceptability of subsequent practice to inform meaning of treaty language).
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and subsequent practice leave the meaning ambiguous, obscure,
or would lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasona-
ble.53
The preambles of both the Main Agreement and the Annex
to the Bonn Accords describe the purpose and intended func-
tion of the ITS. The preamble to the Main Agreement describes
the mission of the ITS as continuing the operations of the Trac-
ing Service, which was established "for the purpose of tracing
missing persons and collecting, classifying, preserving and ren-
dering accessible to governments and interested persons the
documents relating to Germans and non-Germans who were in-
terned in National-Socialist concentration or labor camps or to
non-Germans who were displaced as a result of the Second
World War."54 The preamble to the Annex, which governs rela-
tions between the IC and the ICRC, expresses the IC Members'
desire "that the future operations of the International Tracing
Service shall be conducted in such a way that the information
contained in the archives of the International Tracing Service
shall, as hitherto, be freely available to interested persons, or-
gani[z]ations, and authorities, for humanitarian purposes.55
Annex Article Four ("Article Four") describes who may re-
ceive information from the ITS, and what degree of access such
persons will enjoy.56 The language of Article Four in the origi-
nal 1955 Bonn Accords appears to contemplate relatively permis-
sive rights to access the information contained within the
Archive, stating: "all information which can be of assistance to,
and is of direct interest to, a person or persons requesting such
information" will continue to be provided through appropriate
channels.57 When the Bonn Accords were renewed in 1960, the
drafters narrowed the language of Article Four. 58 The new lan-
53. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 32 (disfavoring use of travaux
preparatoires, limiting their permissibility), see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46,
§325, cmt. (e) (describing Vienna Convention treatment of travaux preparatoires).
54. Bonn Accords, supra note 37, pmbl.
55. Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex pmbl.
56. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 4 (establishing parameters of ac-
cess enjoyed by Members); see also Cohen supra note 3 (describing in general terms
rights of access and restrictions on access).
57. Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 4.
58. Compare Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 4 (outlining rights of access
in relatively broad terms), with 1960 Amendments, supra note 39 (narrowing language
of Annex article IV).
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guage stated the "basic task" of the ITS "is to provide, for hu-
manitarian purposes, to the individuals directly concerned per-
sonal information extracted from its archives and documents. '59
The chapeau of the 1960 Amendments also contains an assurance
from Germany that they will not interfere with the ongoing oper-
ations of the ITS: "For its part, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany shall continue to ensure that the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross may carry out the administra-
tion of the archives and documents of the International Tracing
Service at Arolsen without interference of any kind.
6 °
In 1962, a group of Belgian historians, the Centre National
d'Histoire des Guerres Mondiales made a request to the IC, asking
that the ITS undertake an unspecified historical study.61 As the
IC did not consider the ITS competent in the historical field, the
IC requested that Members submit national research bodies ca-
pable of and interested in conducting research, with the under-
standing that these groups would be invited to make use of the
Archive for historical research. 62 Years later, commencing Janu-
ary 1, 1996, the IC began allowing access to the small portion of
the Archive containing information of a non-sensitive nature.6"
Annex Article Three ("Article Three") describes IC Member
States' rights to access materials within the Archive. The original
1955 text stated that each IC Member would enjoy "free access to
all the archives and documents reposing with the [ITS]", pro-
vided they coordinate their activities with the Director.64 Article
Three was narrowed, effective 1965.65 IC Members may still ac-
59. 1960 Amendments, supra note 39.
60. 1960 Amendments, supra note 39.
61. See U.S. Dept. of State, Airgram A-1457 (declassified),Jan. 9, 1963 [hereinafter
Airgram A-1457], (reporting request from historians that ITS undertake historical
study, requesting names of suitable research organizations); see also U.S. Dept. of State,
Airgram A-313 (declassified), Apr. 3, 1963 [hereinafter Airgram A-313], (responding to
request of Airgram A-1457, suggesting several organizations).
62. See Airgram A-1457, supra note 61 (reporting request); see also Airgram A-313,
supra note 61 (responding to request in Airgram A-1457).
63. See ITS, Historical Research [hereinafter ITS Statement on Historical Re-
search], http://www.its-arolsen.org/english/index.html (follow both "Historical re-
search" hyperlinks) (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) (describing portion of Archive accessible
to historians); cf Max, supra note 16 (illustrating scope and nature of Archive material
inaccessible due to privacy concerns).
64. Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 3.
65. Compare Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 3, with 1965 Amendments,
supra note 40 (amending Annex article III, narrowing terms under which IC Members
can access Archive).
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cess the Archive, but only for the purpose of inspecting the
Archive and documents. 66 The newer language also conditions
IC Member access on agreement by the Director, and makes ex-
plicit the requirement that Annex Article Five ("Article Five") be
observed. 67 Article Five, which never has been amended, ad-
dresses privacy concerns.68 It requires that "all reasonable steps"
be taken to avoid releasing personal information that "might
prejudice the interests of the person or persons concerned or
[the interests] of their relatives. "69
Article Three appears to have been amended in response to
a perceived threat of infiltration by the Soviet bloc. IC Members
were concerned that these governments would attempt to gain
access to the Archive and then search for compromising infor-
mation about their own citizens.7" For this same underlying rea-
son Annex Article Eight, which established means to accede to
the IC, was eliminated, forestalling the possibility of Soviet Bloc
governments joining the ITS.7 '
B. Data Privacy Laws, Jurisdictional Laws, and Capacities and
Immunities of International Organizations
1. Data Privacy Laws
The data privacy laws of IC Members, and the overall ap-
proach to data privacy protection that these laws reflect, have
informed Members' respective approaches to the Archive is-
sue.72 While a comprehensive examination of these laws is be-
66. See 1965 Amendments, supra note 40 (altering language of Annex article III,
making access for purpose of inspection); see also Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting IC
Members' right to inspect).
67. See 1965 Amendments, supra note 40 (adding language to Annex article III
requiring agreement of Director, referencing Annex article V); see also Cohen, supra
note 4 (quoting Annex article V in discussion of IC Member access for inspection).
68. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 5 (requiring steps be taken to
guard privacy); see also Cohen, supra note 4 (quoting Annex article V).
69. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 5; see also Cohen, supra note 4
(quoting Annex article V).
70. See U.S. Dept. of State, Airgram A-280 (declassified), Aug. 5, 1964 [hereinafter
Airgram A-280] (articulating perceived threat of tyrannical communist governments
searching Archive for information on their citizens); see also U.S. Dept. of State, Air-
gram A-908 (declassified), Nov. 20, 1964 [hereinafter Airgram A-908] (proposing
amended language for Annex article III).
71. See Airgram A-280, supra note 70 (describing communist threat); see also Air-
gram A-908, supra note 70 (proposing deletion of Annex article VIII).
72. See Cohen, supra note 4 (contrasting parties' positions and relative strictness of
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yond the scope of this Note, a brief summary of the framework
they provide will aid the discussion that follows. 73 Germany,
along with all EU Member States, is bound by the Council of
Europe Convention on the Automatic Processing of Personal In-
formation ("Council Convention"), which establishes standards
within which EU members must enact data privacy legislation.74
Rather than delving into the minutiae of German data privacy
law, this Note utilizes the Council Convention to describe the
parameters within which German (and other EU) domestic data
privacy laws must fall. Likewise, Germany and all other EU
Members are bound by Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament on the transfer of personal data to third countries
("European Directive 95/46/EC"), so the limits it places on the
transfer of data will be briefly discussed.7 5
Privacy in the United States is understood as a negative
right.76 As a result, the U.S. approach to privacy is structured
around protecting citizens against governmental interference
with individual privacy-government is seen as a threat to pri-
vacy, not as a guarantor thereof.77 By limiting government's abil-
data privacy laws); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (comparing positions
taken by Germany and United States, reporting Germany's desire to create comprehen-
sive data protection mechanism).
73. On data protection laws, see generally, DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD
(Christopher Millard & Mark Ford eds., 1998) (2006) (presenting overview of data pri-
vacy laws worldwide, specific information regarding various jurisdictions); BUSINESS
GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION (Charles E.H. Franklin ed., 1996)
[hereinafter BUSINESS GUIDE] (describing domestic and supranational data privacy reg-
ulations).
74. See Council Convention supra note 5; see also Mark Ford, Council of Europe, in 1
DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD, supra note 73 (discussing Council Convention).
75. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 95/46/EC, O.J. L 281/31
(1995) [hereinafter European Directive 95/46/EC], (1995) (on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, The Simplification of International Data Privacy
Rules, 29 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1128, 1131-32 (2006) (discussing European Directive 95/
46/EC).
76. Negative Rights are those rights the enjoyment of which requires the forbear-
ance or non-action of the other party involved. See BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 609 (Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu eds., 2004) (defining negative rights
within general definition of rights); see also John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke's
Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 191 (contrasting negative rights with positive rights
within discussion of philosopher John Locke's writings on inalienable rights).
77. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards For Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REv. 497, 501-03 (1995) (contrasting bases of U.S. and EU data
privacy regimes, explaining U.S. approach); see also Eric Shapiro, Note, All is Not Fair in
the Privacy Trade: The Safe Harbor Agreement and the World Trade Organization, 71 FORDHAM
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ity to intrude on the sphere of the individual, and operating with
the presumption that, absent reasons to the contrary, govern-
ment should not restrict citizens' access to information, the
United States has traditionally favored more open access to per-
sonal information and disfavored governmental regulation in
this area.7' The European approach reverses the presumption,
viewing the individual's expectation of privacy as a positive
right,79 and government as a guarantor of rather than a threat to
that right.8 " The Council Convention provides an overview of
the parameters of European data privacy laws most relevant to
this Note. In general terms, the Council Convention requires
that signatory States must protect the individual against abuses
resulting from the collection of personal data; must regulate the
flow and exchange of such data; and, in the absence of proper
legal safeguards, must prohibit the processing of sensitive data,
which generally includes data regarding an individual's race,
politics, health, religion, sexual life, criminal record, and other
areas; and allows Member States to carve out derogations in in-
stances where doing so benefits the public interest.8 " Germany,
along with the rest of the EU, provides serious enforcement
mechanisms in its domestic data privacy legislation, with severe
fines and incarceration available to remedy the most egregious
breaches of data privacy rules.8 2
L. REV. 2781, 2784-85 (2003) (describing U.S. and EU approaches to data privacy regu-
lation).
78. See Reidenberg, supra note 77, at 501-03 (outlining U.S. attitude toward data
privacy regulation in historic and constitutional terms); see also Shapiro, supra note 77,
at 2784-85 (contrasting divergent views of United States and EU regarding data privacy
regulation).
79. Positive rights are rights dependent on the positive actions of another party.
See BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 76, at 609 (defining
negative rights within general definition of rights); see also Simmons, supra note 76, at
191 (contrasting negative rights with positive rights within discussion of Locke's writings
on inalienable rights).
80. See Reidenberg, supra note 77, at 501-03 (contrasting bases of U.S. and EU data
privacy regimes, explaining EU approach); see also Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2784-85
(describing U.S. and EU approaches to data privacy regulation).
81. See Council Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1, 4, 6-8, 9(2) (delineating types of
personal data and means of data collection or exchange requiring safeguard, allowing
derogations in public interest) see also Ford, supra note 74 (explaining parameters and
effect of Council Convention).
82. See BUSINESS GUIDE supra note 73, at 193, 221 (describing possible sanctions
resultant from violation of data privacy law in France, Germany); see also Sophie
Boucher & Marc d'Haultfoeuille, France, in 1 DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD,
supra note 73, at 22-24 (outlining sanctions under French data privacy law); Matthias
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European Directive 95/46/EC, enacted to require a uni-
form and adequate degree of protection in situations where per-
sonal data is transferred to third party (i.e. non-EU) countries,
allows for derogations in certain instances.8 3 Grounds for dero-
gation include important public interest grounds, situations in-
volving a data registry intended to provide information to the
public, and data registries that are open to persons with a legiti-
mate interest in the information. 4 In an effort to avoid possible
disruptions in transfers of data from the EU to the United States,
which would have had serious commercial ramifications, the par-
ties negotiated a "Safe Harbor."8 5 The Safe Harbor allows U.S.
companies to self-certify as compliant with EU data privacy stan-
dards, and creates an enforcement mechanism through the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. 6 Both France and Germany have, in
notable instances, allowed broad public access to archives of his-
torical importance that contain potentially sensitive personal in-
formation. The French Government opened files pertaining to
the Algerian War of Independence, and, as a condition of taking
possession of the Berlin Document Center, which holds records
pertaining to Nazi membership, the German Government
agreed to allow continued unfettered access to that archive.8 '
Meister &Joachim Schrey, Germany, in I DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD, supra
note 73, at 26-28 (outlining sanctions under German data privacy law).
83. See European Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 75, art. 26 (enunciating possibil-
ity of derogation); see also Barbara Crutchfield George, Patricia Lynch & Susan J. Mar-
snik, U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply
With the EUData Privacy Directive, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 735, 752 (reviewing framework of data
protection created in European Directive 95/46/EC).
84. See European Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 75, art. 26 (listing permissible
grounds for derogation); see also George et al., supra note 83, at 752 (reviewing frame-
work of data protection created in European Directive 95/46/EC). The Council Con-
vention likewise allows derogations to be created under the laws of the individual State
in situations benefiting the public interest. See Council Convention, supra note 5, art.
9(2) (defining acceptable parameters for derogation).
85. See Reidenberg, supra note 75, at 1132-33 (describing Safe Harbor); see also
Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2786-87 (outlining structure of Safe Harbor).
86. See George et al., supra note 83, at 764-66 (describing mechanics of Safe Har-
bor); see also Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2786-87 (outlining structure of Safe Harbor).
87. See AccEss TO HOLDINGS OF THE BERLIN DOCUMENT CENTER: U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE APPENDIX TO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE S. FOR. REL. SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ORGS., INT'L
SEC., AND HUM. RTS. [hereinafter ACCESS TO BERLIN DOCUMENT CENTER] (1994), availa-
ble at http://www.h-net.org/-german/discuss/transfer/whatis.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2007) (describing background and context of turnover of Berlin Document Center to
German control, enunciating agreement to allow public access under terms of respec-
tive national archives); see also France to Open Archives on Algerian War [hereinafter
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2. Capacities and Immunities of International Organizations
In general terms, an 10 determines its own functional ca-
pacity, which in turn determines what related immunities the 10
will enjoy.88 The default presumption in international law is that
an 10 should enjoy such capacities and immunities as are neces-
sary for the effective fulfillment of its public mandate.89 Na-
tional bodies would otherwise be in a position to make pro-
nouncements binding on the policy decisions of an I.90 The
public mandate of an 10 is demarcated by the extent to which it
was created to conduct an independent activity related to the
functioning of the international community.9 1 To the extent
that an act is necessary for the public purpose of an 10, the 10 is
presumptively immune with respect to that act.92 In response to
this broad ability of an 1O to define its own capacities and immu-
nities, commentators have argued that in certain situations these
immunities should be circumscribed, so that individuals nega-
tively affected by the public function of an 10 might seek redress
for their grievances through legal channels.9
France to Open Archives], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 28, 2000 (reporting French Gov-
ernment announcement that Algerian War archives would no longer be closed to pub-
lic access).
88. See infta notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
89. See A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 89,
151 (1995) (discussing determination of capacities and presumption of immunities of
international organizations); see also Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. 11) (holding United Na-
tions has such capacities as were created in it by Member States-international organi-
zations' capacities are self-determined); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-98
(2d. ed., 1970) (discussing parameters of capacities and immunities of international
organizations).
90. See MULLER, supra note 89, at 151 (justifying need for coextensive capacities
and immunities); see also 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 927 (2d. ed., 1970)
(describing international organizations as immune from process unless immunity ex-
pressly waived).
91. See MULLER, supra note 89, at 88-91 (describing functional capacity view of in-
ternational organizations, wherein capacity is coextensive with function); see also
O'CONNELL, supra note 89, at 98-99 (outlining functional capacity approach to interna-
tional organizations, wherein capacities are coextensive with independent activities for
which international organization was chartered).
92. See MULLER, supra note 89, at 153 (outlining presumption of immunity for in-
ternational organization in pursuit of public purpose); see also O'CONNELL, supra note
89, at 927 (describing international organizations as immune from process unless im-
munity expressly waived).
93. See Emmanuel Gaillard & Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, International Organisations
and Immunity From Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to Bypass, 51 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 1, 5-11
(2002) (arguing in some contexts representation and justice best served by curtailing
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3. Forum for Litigation and the European Union
EU law strongly favors maintaining jurisdiction within the
European Union over actions involving EU domiciles.94 Council
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("Brussels I. Regulation") addresses conflicts ofjurisdic-
tion.9 5 The Brussels I. Regulation contains clauses that address
choice of forum agreements and forum selection in general.96
The Brussels I. Regulation strongly favors honoring forum selec-
tion clauses, providing that when the forum selected is that of a
Member State, and at least one of the parties to the action is
domiciled in the EU, that choice of forum shall be honored. 7
The Brussels I. Regulation also presumes that unless the parties
involved have arranged otherwise, forum selection clauses are
exclusive-they operate to the exclusion of other fora.9" The
Brussels I. Regulation is strongly protective of EU Member juris-
diction over pending actions, with its Article II having been in-
terpreted to strongly favor the jurisdiction of EU Members over
that of non-Member States, even when the defendant might be
seriously inconvenienced by having to litigate the complaint in
immunities of international organizations); see also MULLER, supra note 89, at 176-82
(observing curtailment of immunities might be justified in certain circumstance).
94. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRA-
TION 438-456 (2d. ed. 2002) (discussing EU approach to jurisdictional issues).
95. See Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J.
L 12/1, arts. 2-6, 23, 27 (2001) [hereinafter Brussels I. Regulation] (establishing frame-
work of EU approach to conflict of jurisdiction); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 94, at
438-56 (discussing EU treatment of foreign judgments and assertions of jurisdiction in
context of Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.0. L 299/32 (1972), amended by 0J. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by 0.J. L 388/1 (1982), amended by 0.J. L 285/1 (1989) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention], legal framework subsequendy replaced by Brussels I. Regulation).
96. See Brussels I. Regulation, supra note 95, arts. 2-6, 23, 27 (2001) [hereinafter
Brussels I. Regulation] (establishing framework of EU approach to conflict ofjurisdic-
tion); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 94, at 438-56 (discussing EU framework regarding
foreign judgments and assertions of jurisdiction in context of Brussels Convention).
97. See Brussels I. Regulation, supra note 95, art. 23(1) (establishing priority of EU
forum over non-EU forum); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 94, at 438-56 (discussing
priority of EU forum in EU law, in context of Brussels Convention).
98. See Brussels I. Regulation, supra note 95, art. 23(1) (mandating presumption of
exclusivity in forum selection clauses); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 94, at 438-56 (dis-
cussing presumption of exclusivity of forum selection clauses in EU law, under Brussels
Convention).
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the EU Member State."9 Essentially, so long as one party to the
litigation is an EU domicile, and at least one party to the action
brings a related action in an EU forum, the entire complaint will
be heard in the EU forum.100
II. CONFLICTING VIEWS REGARDING AMENDMENTS
AND SAFEGUARDS
Part II of this Note contrasts the position taken most promi-
nently by Germany ("German Approach") with that taken most
prominently by the United States ("U.S. Approach"). The re-
spective positions are described in the context of the language of
the Bonn Accords, past practice of the ITS, and relevant areas of
domestic and international law. This Note describes each ap-
proach in general terms; while every effort has been made to
accurately and concisely approximate the respective positions, it
is recognized that all the nuance of each view will not have been
captured.
A. The U.S. Approach
The United States has been one of several IC Member States
aggressively advocating the immediate opening of the Archive
on the basis of the current Bonn Accords framework."0 ' The
U.S. Approach has argued that all Holocaust records in the
Archive should immediately be made available, and that no
amendment of the Bonn Accords is necessary to do so. 10 2 A pri-
mary motivation for the U.S. Approach has been to enable ac-
cess to the Archive without further delay, so that Holocaust survi-
vors can see the benefits of access within their lifetimes. 10 3
99. See Brussels I. Regulation, supra note 95, art. 2 (creating strong preference for
EU forum for pending actions); see also Owusu v. Jackson, Case C-281/02, [2005] E.C.R.
1-1383, 46 (holding that although Jamaican defendant seriously inconvenienced by
litigating in England, stay in favor of foreign forum on basis of forum non conveniens not
permitted).
100. See Brussels I. Regulation, supra note 95, art. 2 (creating strong preference for
EU forum); see also Owusu, E.C.R. 1-1383, 46 (denying petition forforum non conveniens
stay).
101. See Cohen, supra note 4 (framing Archive issue as dispute between United
States and Germany); see also Gordon, supra note 17 (reporting recent efforts by United
States to open Archive).
102. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting U.S. statements favoring immediate open-
ing of Archive); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing U.S. position
favoring immediate access).
103. See Max, supra note 2 (quoting Paul Shapiro, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Mu-
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For the U.S. Approach to prevail, it would be necessary to
establish that the language of Article Four and subsequent prac-
tice do not preclude liberalizing access to the Archive. °4 One
could argue that Article Four does accommodate the provision
of access for historical research purposes as a secondary mission
of the ITS: the plain language of Article Four does not expressly
exclude accommodating persons interested in conducting his-
torical research, and the language of the preambles to the Main
Agreement and the Annex can be read to suggest a more broad
humanitarian purpose for the ITS."°5 The Vienna Conventions
allow subsequent practice to be used to interpret the meaning of
a treaty provision.106 As the 1960 version of Article Four is the
version in force today, it could be argued that the subsequent
practice referenced above-the Belgian historians' request and
the opening of non-sensitive sections of the Archive in 1996-
establish that access can be liberalized without amending the
Bonn Accords.'0 7 At the very least, subsequent practice renders
the meaning of Article Four ambiguous, allowing reference to
the travaux preparatiores under norms of treaty interpretation.' °8
In that regard, the travaux preparatoires reveal that the narrowing
of the Bonn Accords and the establishment of a highly restrictive
access protocol in the 1960's came in direct response to no
longer salient Cold-War-era concerns.10 9 Because the political
conditions that obliged such restrictions on access to the Archive
seum, describing process as being on actuarial timetable, not diplomat's or archivist's
timetable); see also Gordon, supra note 17 (quoting Karel Fracapane, Secretary of Inter-
national Holocaust Task Force on Education, Research, and Remembrance, character-
izing situation as emergency, with number of remaining survivors quickly dwindling).
104. See 1960 Amendments, supra note 39 (amending Annex article IV); see also
Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting argument by former ITS Director that unless amended,
Bonn Accords forbid access).
105. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, pmbl, Annex pmbl.; see also 1960 Amend-
ments, supra note 39 (amending Annex article IV)
106. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31 (permitting use of subsequent
practice to inform meaning); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46, § 325(2)
(describing acceptability of subsequent practice to inform meaning of treaty language).
107. See Airgram A-1457, supra note 61 (reporting request by Belgian Historians
for study to be conducted, indicating decision of IC to invite researchers to access
Archive); see also ITS Statement on Historical Research, supra note 63 (describing por-
tion of Archive open to research, containing non-sensitive information).
108. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 32 (allowing use of travaux
preparatoires in face of ambiguity of treaty language and subsequent practice), see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46, §325, cmt. (e) (describing Vienna Convention
treatment of travaux preparatoires).
109. See Airgram A-280, supra note 70 (describing perception of threat of Archive
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no longer exist, it could be argued that a policy favoring secrecy
over access is no longer justified.1 0 On these same grounds, it
could be argued that, subject to the unanimous approval of the
IC, interested persons can be granted access to the Archive and
materials therein by means of the creation of operational direc-
tives. Of course, reasonable measures would have to be taken
to protect the privacy of individuals whose data is contained in
the Archive, as required by Article Five. 12
B. The German Approach
The German Approach acknowledges the importance of al-
lowing access, but conditions opening the Archive on amending
the Bonn Accords to implement substantial data privacy safe-
guards to protect known or knowable individuals and their fami-
lies. 1 3 In contrast with the U.S. Approach, which emphasizes
the anticipated general social benefit of opening the Archive,
the German Approach focuses on the potential harm to individ-
uals that could result.114 The German Approach frames the
Archive as a collection of personal data, and views the ITS as
obliged to guard the privacy of the individuals concerned.1 15
Regarding Article Four, the German Approach might argue
that by the plain language of the Bonn Accords the tracing func-
tion is the central responsibility of the ITS, and that unless the
infiltration by communist governments); see also Airgram A-908, supra note 70 (propos-
ing more restrictive language for Annex article III).
110. See Fleishman, supra note 14 (describing longstanding desire of Holocaust
survivors to access Archive); see also Campbell, supra note 15 (recounting survivor's de-
sire that Archive be accessible); Gordon, supra note 17 (reporting disbelief at continued
closure of Archive expressed by family members of Holocaust survivors and survivors
themselves, including Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel).
111. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, art. 2, (establishing process of IC creating
operational directives to be carried out by ICRC); see also ICRC Statement on Historical
Research, supra note 22 (describing ICRC role carrying out directives).
112. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, Annex art. 5 (establishing requirement of
reasonable measures); see also Cohen, supra note 4 (quoting Annex article V).
113. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting German position favoring data privacy
safeguards); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing German concern
over potential release of sensitive personal information from Archive).
114. See Cohen, supra note 4 (outlining U.S. and German positions regarding
Archive); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing U.S. and German
positions regarding Archive).
115. See Cohen, supra note 4 (indicating concern over possible release of personal
information); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (describing German concern
over potential dissemination of sensitive personal information from Archive).
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Bonn Accords are amended, the ITS mandate does not accom-
modate historical research." 6 Subsequent practice supports this
interpretation; the ITS has historically operated as a closed
archive devoted almost exclusively to its tracing task. 1 7 Outside
parties have been refused access, and IC Members, per the terms
of Article Three, have only been allowed access subject to agree-
ment with the ITS Director.' 1 8 In view of this language and prac-
tice, a strong argument could be made that a re-interpretation of
the Bonn Accords would violate the norms of treaty interpreta-
tion, favoring selective (re)interpretation over actual treaty lan-
guage. 19 Further, the argument could be raised that, in decid-
ing what capacities and immunities the ITS should enjoy, the
need to facilitate redress for individuals whose personal informa-
tion might be released justifies restricting or tempering its im-
munities and making it reachable by legal process should indi-
viduals' data privacy rights be compromised.1 20 In other words,
the German Approach might seek to ensure that data subjects
could seek redress directly from the ITS, so thereby the ITS and
not the data subjects themselves would bear the burden of en-
forcing the protection of sensitive personal data. 12 1
C. Contrasting the Two Approaches
To those favoring the U.S. Approach, the German Ap-
116. See 1960 Amendments, supra note 39 (amending Annex article IV to state the
"basic task" of the ITS "is to provide, for humanitarian purposes, to the individuals
directly concerned personal information extracted from its archives and documents.");
see also Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting German position that Bonn Accords must be
amended).
117. See Cohen, supra note 4 (describing ITS focus on tracing function, inaccessi-
bility of Archive); see also Gordon, supra note 17 (reporting on Tracing Service and
closed Archive).
118. See 1965 Amendments, supra note 40 (altering language of Annex article III,
making access for purpose of inspection, subject to agreement with the ITS Director);
see also Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting IC Members' right to inspect); Max, supra note 2
(indicating rarity of outsider accessing Archive).
119. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 32 (disfavoring use of travaux
preparatoires, limiting their permissibility), see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §325, cmt. (e)
(describing Vienna Convention treatment of travaux preparatoires).
120. See Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, supra note 93 (arguing in some contexts repre-
sentation and justice best served by curtailing international organization immunities);
see also MULLER, supra note 52, at 176-82 (observing curtailment of immunities might be
justified in certain circumstance).
121. See Cohen, supra note 4 (describing German arguments in favor of stringent
data privacy safeguard mechanism); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (indi-
cating German position in favor of safeguards to prevent release of sensitive data).
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proach, inasmuch as it deemed amendment of the Bonn Ac-
cords a necessary condition, could be seen as favoring legal for-
malities at the expense of achieving rapid resolution. 122 After
all, attempts to amend the Bonn Accords have foundered repeat-
edly in the past, as IC Members continually bogged down in dis-
cussions over legal formalities.1 23 Advocates of the U.S. Ap-
proach have argued that it is improper to hold the ITS to the
domestic legal standard of a Member State, and that doing so
only serves to delay resolution. 12 '4  The latter argument has
strong legal support: as an 10 acting pursuant to its public pur-
pose-which under the U.S. Approach would include providing
access to the Archive-the ITS is presumptively immune from
German law.1 25 Additionally, the German Constitution grants
treaty obligations primacy over national laws, and as a general
matter, States are obliged to avoid acting to frustrate the objec-
tives of treaties to which they are signatories.126 If, as could be
argued, the IC has determined that opening the Archive for re-
search is part of the ITS mission, it could also be argued that the
German Constitution and international law both suggest limits
to the extent to which it is justifiable for Germany to continue as
the lone holdout in favor of a certain course of action.1 2 7
Advocates for the U.S. Approach might also point out that
German data privacy law did not prevent the Berlin Document
122. See Cohen, supra note 4 (contrasting U.S. and German arguments); see also
Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (contrasting U.S. and German arguments).
123. See Cohen, supra note 4 (indicating past efforts to reach agreement had
failed); see also Max, supra note 2 (reviewing current difficulty surrounding access is-
sue).
124. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting insinuation that Germany was intention-
ally seeking to delay process); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (quoting
Johannes Houwink ten Cate, Professor of History and Genocide Studies at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, "[t]hey have been stalling for eight years").
125. See MULLER, supra note 52, at 89, 151 (discussing determination of capacities
and presumption of immunities of international organizations); see also O'CONNELL,
supra note 52, at 94-98 (discussing determination of capacities and presumption of im-
munities of international organizations).
126. See Basic Law, supra note 45, art. 25 (stating treaty obligations take prece-
dence over domestic German law); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 18
(declaring States must not act to frustrate objectives of treaty to which are signatory).
127. See, e.g., Nations Agree, supra note 1 (reporting agreement reached by IC Mem-
bers to open Archive for research purposes); see also Basic Law, supra note 45, art. 25
(establishing treaty obligations supersede domestic German law); Vienna Convention,
supra note 46, art. 18 (declaring States must avoid frustrating objectives of treaty to
which are signatory).
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Center from remaining freely accessible to the public, nor did
French data privacy law, which must function within the same
parameters as German data privacy law, foreclose opening the
military archive pertaining to the Algerian War of Indepen-
dence. 2  European Directive 95/46/EC specifically contem-
plates exceptions for archives containing important historical in-
formation or data registries that are open to persons with a legit-
imate interest, and the Council Convention allows derogations
to be created under the laws of the individual State in situations
benefiting the public interest. 29  Advocates of the U.S. Ap-
proach might argue that even if the ITS were subject to EU data
privacy law, these grounds for exception would permit the ITS to
transfer data to jurisdictions not meeting EU data protection
standards, and would allow IC Members within the EU to relax
protection standards in light of a greater public interest."13 The
fact that the Safe Harbor was created in a business context would
illustrate that derogations from European Directive 95/46/EC
are certainly possible, provided the parties are sufficiently moti-
vated. "3 In sum, the U.S. Approach might assert that so long as
the IC were to take reasonable precautions to protect the privacy
of individuals (as required by Article Five), there is no legal im-
pediment to the IC opening the Archive as an administrative
matter, by providing operating instructions to the ICRC as de-
scribed in the Bonn Accords. 13 2
128. See ACCESS TO BERLIN DOCUMENT CENTER, supra note 87 (describing contin-
ued access to Berlin Document Center following turnover to German control); see also
France to Open Archives, supra note 87 (indicating France to open military archive per-
taining to Algerian war). French and German data privacy law must both conform to
the Council Convention and European Directive 95/46/EC. See supra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text.
129. See Council Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(2) (defining acceptable parame-
ters for derogation); see also European Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 75, art. 26 (list-
ing permissible grounds for derogation); George et al., supra note 83, at 752-53 (review-
ing framework of data protection created in European Directive 95/46/EC).
130. See Council Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(2) (defining parameters for dero-
gation); see also European Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 75, art. 26 (listing grounds
for derogation).
131. See Reidenberg, supra note 75, at 1132-33 (describing Safe Harbor); see also
Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2786-87 (outlining structure of Safe Harbor).
132. See Bonn Accords, supra note 37, art. 2, Annex art. 5 (establishing process of
IC creating operational directives to be carried out by ICRC, requiring reasonable mea-
sures to protect privacy of individuals whose information is in Archive); see also ICRC
Statement on Historical Research, supra note 22 (describing ICRC role in carrying out
directives).
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To those favoring the German Approach, the effort to enact
a rigorous data protection scheme might be better understood
an attempt to prevent additional harm befalling those who al-
ready suffered in the Holocaust, and not as an attempt to foist a
Member State's domestic legal standard on the rest of the IC.13
3
During the negotiation process, however, Germany voiced con-
cerns that proceeding without amendment would leave the Ger-
man Government vulnerable to suit by German citizens whose
data privacy was violated, and indicated it could not approve of a
plan that did not substantially comport with German data pri-
vacy standards.1 3 ' These statements enhanced the impression
held by some parties to the negotiations that Germany was effec-
tively attempting to impose their domestic legal standard on the
ITS, and was trying to delay resolution of the Archive issue."t 5
In support of the German Approach, it could be argued
that the contents of the Archive make it sufficiently different
from the Berlin Document Center and the French Military
Archives as to make direct comparison inappropriate.1 36 Both
the Berlin Document Center and the French Military Archives
contain information mainly related to perpetrators, not victims,
which would seemingly alter the moral calculus. 37 In light of
this difference, a more circumspect approach to access, placing
data protection in the foreground, would be a moral impera-
133. See Cohen, supra note 4 (contrasting U.S. and German arguments); see also
Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (examining U.S. and German positions).
134. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting Germany's stated concern over suits by
citizens, desire for data protection mechanism substantially comporting with domestic
data privacy law); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (reporting German argu-
ments in favor of strong data protection mechanism).
135. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting insinuation that Germany was intention-
ally seeking to delay process); see also Loewenberg & Borger, supra note 6 (quoting
Johannes Houwink ten Cate, Professor of History and Genocide Studies at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, "[t] hey have been stalling for eight years").
136. See Cohen, supra note 4 (describing information within Archive as pertaining
to Holocaust victims, quoting statement of former ITS director Charles Biederman that
no moral justification exists for opening Archive); see also AcCEsS TO BERLIN DOCUMENT
CENTER, supra note 87 (describing contents as pertaining to Nazi party membership and
Nazi-affiliated organizations).
137. See Cohen, supra note 4 (indicating information within Archive pertains to
Holocaust victims, quoting former ITS director Charles Biederman stating no moral
justification exists for opening Archive); see also AccEss TO BERLIN DOCUMENT CENTER,




III. RECONCILING DATA PROTECTION WITH
ARCHIVAL ACCESS
The substantive focus of the German Approach-that con-
trols should be put in place to guard against and remedy any
possible breach of individuals' private data-is not addressed by
simply arguing that amendment to the Bonn Accords is unneces-
sary as a matter of international law. 139 As discussed above, the
IC has reached an agreement to amend the Bonn Accords to
accommodate research, although the text of this agreement has
not been made publicly available. 4 Part III of this Note argues
that the IC could create a data protection regime through means
other than amending the Bonn Accords. It is hoped that by sug-
gesting a data protection mechanism that does not require
amending the Bonn Accords, this Note will illustrate that, aside
from the delays inherent in ratifying treaty amendments, the ar-
gument over whether or not to amend the Bonn Accords was
largely immaterial to the substantive issues under discussion. In
imagining an alternative to amending the Bonn Accords it be-
comes apparent that any solution will likely be complicated; in
the interest of finding rapid resolution, one must hope that the
IC will proceed by the least complicated means possible.14'
A. A Hypothetical Means to Achieve Data Protection, Without
Amending the Bonn Accords
The IC could effectuate a protection and enforcement
mechanism within the existing Bonn Accords framework by ap-
proving a resolution and issuing operational directives to the
ICRC, the standard means by which the IC guides ITS activi-
138. See Cohen, supra note 4 (reporting comments placing Germany's arguments
in favor of stringent data protection mechanism in moral context); see also Loewenberg
& Borger, supra note 6 (describing German arguments favoring strong data protec-
tion).
139. See supra notes 113-15, 105-10 and accompanying text (encapsulating German
approach to Archive issue, constructing argument that amendments unnecessary).
140. See supra notes 1, 10 and accompanying text (indicating agreement signed,
ratification in process, text not available).
141. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing urgency of situation,
need for most rapid resolution possible).
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ties.142 Clearly, under international law, the IC is entitled to
guide the ITS within the limits of its public purpose; an 10 by
default enjoys such capacities and immunities as are necessary
for the effective fulfillment of its public mandate. 1" 3 As a basic
matter, the operational directives would have to include the ad-
ministrative guidance necessary to facilitate access-for instance,
describing whether access would be on-site in Bad Arolsen or
through the duplication and provision of materials off-site.' 4"
A data privacy protection and enforcement mechanism
might take shape along the following lines. First, through a non-
disclosure agreement ("NDA"), the IC might mandate that any
party accessing the Archive must affirm that, absent the written
consent of the individual data subject, the person gaining access
agrees to refrain from disseminating sensitive personal data per-
taining to that subject in any way that could render that subject
identifiable.145 Second, the NDA could specify that any breach
of data would be deemed to have occurred in either the country
of domicile of the data subject or at the site of the Archive (Bad
Arolsen, Germany)146 Third, the resolution, directives, and
NDA might specify that the data subject, their immediate heirs,
and the ITS Director (on behalf of the two other parties) are all
beneficiaries of the agreement between the ITS and the party
accessing the Archive, and as such are entitled to pursue injunc-
tive relief and/or damages.1 47 The text of the NDA might also
include an explicitly exclusive forum selection clause, specifying
that the data subject and/or heir, or the ITS Director on the
142. See supra notes 42, 111 and accompanying text (outlining process of IC ad-
ministration through issuing directives).
143. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining presumption of coex-
tensive capacities and immunities).
144. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (indicating potential solution involv-
ing duplication of Archive off-site access).
145. Recent publication of material from Archive with subject rendered anony-
mous seems to have provoked no negative reaction from German Government. See, e.g.,
Max, supra note 22 (including examples of information from Archive, rendered anony-
mous); see also Fleishman, supra note 14 (recounting information on anonymous indi-
vidual victims contained in Archive).
146. This would strongly favor EU Members maintaining jurisdiction over pending
actions arising under this agreement. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text
(explaining strong preference for EU forum under Brussels I. Regulation).
147. Allowing the Director to maintain an action would create greater likelihood
of enforcement, and avoid shifting burden of enforcement to individual data subjects.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (enunciating argument against burdening
data subjects with enforcement of their own data privacy rights).
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subject or heir's behalf is entitled, at their discretion, to bring an
action in their own country of domicile, in the country of domi-
cile of the party accessing the Archive, or in Germany (the site of
the Archive). 4 ' Under the EU approach to forum selection, al-
lowing data subjects or the ITS Director to bring the action in
their chosen venue would achieve a very high degree of certainty
that the NDA between the ITS and the researcher could be en-
forced under a data privacy regime favorable to data subjects-
one which provides sufficient remedies and enforcement mecha-
nisms.14  In the case of German citizens, such mechanisms
taken together would essentially guarantee that unless they were
to elect otherwise, a release of their private data would be reme-
diable under German law.15° As further means to achieve cer-
tainty, and pursuant to its public purpose, the IC could deem the
ITS present in Germany to the extent necessary to facilitate pur-
suit of remediation for breaches of data privacy.' An approach
of this type would require little in the way of administrative over-
sight, as enforcement would be effectuated through existing do-
mestic and supranational legal systems, should the need arise. 152
Would this type of approach to protecting personal infor-
mation within the Archive be satisfactory to those favoring the
German Approach?' 5 3 Outside the context of actual negotia-
tions there is no way to know, however, one might view this situa-
tion as analogous to that which led to the Safe Harbor being
created within the European Directive 95/46/EC-where the
benefits of allowing access to data outweighed the careful in-
148. With respect to litigation involving EU domiciles, forum selection clauses are
presumed exclusive, and their enforcement is highly favored. See supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text (outlining EU approach to forum selection clauses).
149. See supra notes 81-82, 97-98 and accompanying text (describing data privacy
law framework within EU and EU Member States, outlining EU approach to forum
selection clauses).
150. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (describing favoring of EU fo-
rum under Brussels I. Regulation).
151. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (outlining capacities and immu-
nities of international organizations, pointing out immunity is presumed unless explic-
itly waived, indicating potential justifications for waiver of immunity).
152. Conversely, any effort to proactively guard data privacy, such as by redacting
documents before rendering them accessible, would further burden those interested in
gaining rapid access by further increasing the time needed to prepare the Archive. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing urgency of situation, need for rapid
resolution).
153. See supra notes 113-15 (describing German point of view favoring privacy safe-
guards at the expense of rapid access).
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stincts of officials accustomed to enforcing stringent data privacy
regimes.154 Further, in light of the strong equitable arguments
in favor of allowing access to the Archive,' 55 and in light of the
fact that derogations in the public interest are available under
the data privacy regimes at issue, 15 6 the favored approach should
include reasonable measures to safeguard personal information
as required by Annex Article Five, with great weight given to the
public interest served by allowing access to the archive. 157 Rea-
sonable protections, interpreted in light of the equities discussed
above, 58 should weigh the benefits of access more heavily than
the benefits of elaborate data protection mechanisms. 15 9
B. Amendment or Not-Why is it Important?
Leaving aside the questions of whether an ad-hoc data pro-
tection mechanism as described here would be effective,
whether it would be fair to burden data subjects with an enforce-
ment role, and whether, given the amount of time that has
elapsed, any real harm is likely to result if the Archive is simply
opened with no additional data privacy controls, the fundamen-
tal metric of success or failure in this situation will be the length
of time required to successfully open the Archive.16 ° Although
amendments have been negotiated and signed, the slow process
of ratification is still delaying the opening of the Archive.' 6 1
Ironically, IC Members are again raising the possibility of pro-
154. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing Safe Harbor agree-
ment and underlying commercial rationale).
155. See supra notes 13-14, 25-30, 103 and accompanying text (describing potential
benefits of opening Archive, urgency of situation, need for rapid resolution).
156. See supra notes 81, 83-84 and accompanying text (describing grounds for der-
ogation within EU data privacy law framework).
157. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing in overall context of
Bonn Accords Annex article V requirement that reasonable means be taken to protect
individual privacy).
158. See supra notes 13-14, 25-30, 103 and accompanying text (describing potential
benefits of opening Archive, urgency of situation, need for rapid resolution).
159. In light of the presumably remote potential for individuals to be harmed,
versus the likely benefits of opening the Archive, simplicity and rapidity should be
sought out. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 13-14, 25-30, 103 and accompanying text (describing potential
benefits of opening Archive, urgency of situation, need for rapid resolution).
161. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (explaining status of ratification,
likely timeframe for completion).
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ceeding by means other than amendment.1 62 In light of this situ-
ation, and considering that the proposed amendments might yet
be discarded, it is unfortunate that so much time was spent argu-
ing over whether or not to amend the Bonn Accords, rather
than quickly settling that question and focusing instead on sub-
stantive legal and political issues. 163
Despite the delay inherent in the ratification of amend-
ments, proceeding via amendment does bring important, albeit
less tangible benefits. The amendments will have enshrined a
formal basis for access, and ratification by all IC Members will
affirm broad Member support for this element of the ITS mis-
sion. 1 64 Further, while aggressive reinterpretation of treaty lan-
guage might offer the most expedient solution, such an ap-
proach comes at the cost of devaluing the treaty language itself
and subordinating longstanding treaty commitments to political
convenience-devaluing international legal frameworks in gen-
eral.1 65 The process of amendment and the debate surrounding
this process facilitates greater transparency regarding the opera-
tions of the ITS, which, considering its history of undue secrecy,
is an important benefit not to be overlooked. 66 A formal and
transparent process might, in theory, also lead to greater involve-
ment by constituencies within IC Member States, as well as pro-
vide notice to other stakeholders who wish to make their views
known. 6 7 To retain the benefits of proceeding formally without
needlessly causing further delay in the opening of the Archive,
the IC might consider adopting the current amendments on an
interim basis as an administrative directive, pending their formal
ratification by all IC Members-a strategy that would allow the
162. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (mentioning potential revisiting of
need for amendments).
163. See supra notes 13-14, 25-30, 103 and accompanying text (explaining possible
benefits of opening Archive, urgency of situation, need for rapid resolution).
164. See supra notes 20, 42 and accompanying text (indicating Member States are
pursuing ratification, mentioning element of consensus-based operation of the IC).
165. The Vienna Convention disfavors interpretation of treaty text in contraven-
tion of plain language and/or subsequent practice. See supra notes 49-52 and accompa-
nying text (outlining elements of Vienna Convention norms of treaty interpretation).
166. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting Archive has long been
closed to outsiders).
167. Debate over the Archive in recent years and media reports surrounding it
have raised general awareness of the issue. See supra note 17 and accompanying text
(citing article reporting disbelief among interested public upon learning of existence of
Archive, and that Archive is inaccessible).
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IC to shift its focus to resolving the technical and funding issues
it faces in making the promise of access a tangible reality.1 68
CONCLUSION
Resolving the ITS dispute has always been contingent on
finding an outcome that is politically acceptable to all IC Mem-
ber States. The continued failure to successfully effectuate ac-
cess to the Archive is not due to any particularly thorny legal
issues, but rather seems to derive from IC Members' divergent
assessments of the equities involved and the inherent difficulty
of operating on a consensus basis. The debate over whether or
not the Bonn Accords must be amended seemed to distract the
IC from the central underlying issue-whether opening the
Archive presented a sufficient risk of individuals being harmed
through release of their private data, as to warrant creating a
stringent and proactive data protection mechanism. Although
in theory the IC might have proceeded without amending the
Bonn Accords, it seems unlikely that sidestepping the amend-
ment process would have made agreement on the substantive
issues any less difficult. The debate over amending or not simply
had to be resolved either way, so that the underlying substantive
issues could be fully engaged. Proceeding by amendment will
itself bring certain benefits. By amending rather than broadly
reinterpreting the Bonn Accords, the IC will stabilize their
meaning and enhance their authority. Likewise, in a small way,
the stability and authority of the international legal system as a
whole will benefit.
The situation of the ITS is unique, both in a historical sense
and due to the overwhelming need to rapidly find a workable
solution. In light of the human cost of continued delay, and
considering the likelihood that unless the process is somehow
expedited it could still be years before the Archive is opened, in
this particular circumstance perhaps a creative solution is war-
ranted. The IC might consider adopting the amendments on an
interim basis as operational directives, in a way analogous to the
proposed solution outlined above.'69 In this way, whatever solu-
168. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (explaining capacity of IC to
guide ITS operations through directives, positing means to proceed by directives rather
than amendment).
169. See supra notes 111-12, 142-59 and accompanying text (explaining capacity of
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tion that has been settled upon could be implemented immedi-
ately, minimizing the delays inherent in treaty ratification. By
continuing to pursue ratification, the IC could likewise reap
whatever less tangible benefits result from observing that partic-
ular legal formality.1
71
IC to guide ITS operations through directives, positing hypothetical means to proceed
by directives rather than amendment).
170. See supra notes 164-67 (positing potential benefits of observing formality of
amendment).
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